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Jagdish Bhagwati has been an intellectual leader in many ways. Perhaps less known is the 
way in which he has consistently examined and exposed the political economy of the trade-
environment and trade-social policy debate as it has been shaped in the United States and 
Europe.2 This essay condenses prior work of mine concerning trade-environment issues which has 
benefited from and run parallel to Jagdish=s work. 
While scores of northern commentators criticize the non-transparency of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in their examination of trade-environment issues, they often ignore the 
linkage between domestic politics in powerful states and international trade measures. 
Consciously or unconsciously, they blur this crucial linkage that divides WTO members and 
exacerbates conflicts and scuttles them to the WTO in the first place. Yet it is this underlying 
domestic-international, two-level game3 that also needs to be made more transparent, since its 
examination demonstrates that it is this nexus more than the WTO=s lack of transparency that 
results in trade-environment conflicts. 
                                                 
1 Gregory Shaffer is Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law School, Director of the UW 
European Union Center; and Co-Director of the UW Center on World Affairs and the Global Economy. This essay 
is taken from a number of works, but primarily,AWTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on 
Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages for the WTO=s Future,@Fordham International Law Journal 608-651 
(Nov.-Dec. 2000) (a special issue on AThe Future of the World Trade Organization@). See also Gregory Shaffer, The 
WTO Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO=s Treatment of Trade and Environment 
Matters, 25 Harv. Env=l L. Rev. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Shaffer, WTO Under Challenge], Gregory Shaffer, Power, 
Governance and the WTO, in Power and Global Governance, Michael Barnett and Bud Duvall, eds. (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); and Gregory Shaffer and Yvonne Apea, AInstitutional Choice in the GSP Case: Who 
Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences,@ Journal of World Trade (forthcoming 2005). 
2 See e.g. Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (2004), at 135-161; Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade 
Liberalisation and AFair Trade@ Demands: Addressing the Environmental and Labour Standards Issues, in A 
Stream of Windows 247 (Jagdish Bhagwati ed., 1998); and Jagdish Bhagwati, The Agenda of the WTO, in 
Challenges to the New World Trade Organization (P. van Dijck & G. Faber eds., 1996). See also Jagdish Bhagwati, 
Free Trade Today (2002).  
3 On two-level game analysis in international relations, see Robert Putman, Diplomacy and Domestic 
Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, 42 Int=l Org. 427 (1988); and Double-Edged Diplomacy: International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993). For an application to the WTO, see Gregory 




                                                
This essay makes two central points about debates over the WTO=s treatment of trade-
environment matters. First, the U.S. public is relatively government-averse and foreigner-wary. It 
is thus far less likely to support financing of domestic and international programs that directly 
address environmental concerns than to support trade restrictions against foreign imports. Trade 
restrictions against foreign imports impose costs on domestic constituents, but these costs are less 
transparent than the costs of positive environmental programs. Domestic politicians and the mass 
public therefore respond more favorably to calls for trade restrictions against unrepresented 
foreigners. Many WTO critics employ the rhetoric of fighting Amultinational corporations,@4 but 
the sanctions that they advocate can harm the poor in developing countries who are not consulted 
about them. Positive assistance programs, on the other hand, are both more efficient and equitable. 
Yet whatever political party is in control, domestic political processes prefer to shift costs through 
trade restrictions onto foreigners who, in a world of asymmetric power, tend to come from poorer, 
smaller countries. The result is North-South, trade-environment policy controversies brought 
before the WTO on account of the United States= imposition of unilateral trade restrictions against 
developing country imports, as opposed to negotiated package agreements involving financial and 
technical assistance.5  
Second, domestic deregulatory policies within the United States, whether concerning 
social policy or environmental protection, can encourage further backlash against the WTO and 
the international trade liberalization policies that it facilitates. Although it is primarily these 
domestic policies that will be problematic, U.S. political processes more easily focus on trade 
liberalization as the culprit. To attempt to counter this backlash, trade-liberals could work with 
environmental advocates to address their concerns through specific domestic and international 
environmental programs. This policy response, however, is constrained by U.S. domestic politics 
for the reasons just stated. Thus, should the United States continue to push for trade liberalization 
 
4 See, e.g., Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza, Whose World Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization 
and the Erosion of Democracy ix (1999) (where the Preface by Ralph Nader refers to Aan autocratic system of 
international governance that favors corporate interests@). 
5 Package agreements could, of course, be combined with monitoring and, eventually, trade restrictions, 




                                                
policies without more coherently addressing domestic and international environmental concerns, 
it can trigger further backlash against the international trading regime. 
 
The Predominant Focus on Trade-Environment Linkages: Should WTO Rules Facilitate 
Trade Restrictions on Environmental Grounds? 
North-South Perspectives on Trade Restrictions on Environmental Grounds. The WTO 
became a household name not because of the almost half century of multilateral trade negotiations 
leading to its current state, nor because of its multiple daily committee meetings in Geneva, but 
because of the dramatic anti-WTO protests and riots in Seattle, Washington, in November 1999 at 
the WTO=s third Ministerial Meeting highlighting trade-social policy conflicts.6  The two central 
claims of the protestors were, first, that the WTO system favors large corporate interests at the 
expense of workers, consumers, the environment and developing countries, and second, that it is a 
closed, trade-biased, anti-democratic institution. Critics link these substantive and procedural 
claims, declaring that it is the non-transparent procedures of the WTO that lead to pro-corporate, 
neoliberal outcomes.  
The preferred remedy of many of these critics is trade restrictions on environmental 
grounds. I call this the northern perspective because it is almost solely a demand of 
northern/western nations and their constituents.7  This does not in itself signify that the demand 
for trade restrictions is correct or incorrect, but the situation=s political economy needs to be 
recognized. Although developing country critics of the WTO demand fewer WTO constraints on 
their abilities to implement social and development policies, they largely oppose trade restrictions 
on environmental grounds, particularly where they would be implemented through a unilateral 
determination by the United States.8 On the other hand, northern protestors, northern academics, 
 
6 As an Asheville, North Carolina, newspaper reported, ABefore this week, you might have thought the 
WTO was a wrestling organization seen on a cable channel you don=t get.@ Mark Barrett, Trade Anger Reverberates; 
Issues Impact WNC, Asheville Citizen-Times, Dec. 2, 1999, at A1. 
7 The terms Anorthern@ and Awestern@ are used interchangeably in this essay to distinguish developed 
country positions from those of the developing world. This, of course, does not mean that all constituencies around 
the globe can be divided on this basis, but the political economy of the situation is clear to any careful observer. 
8 See, e.g., Third World Intellectuals and NGOs Statement Against Linkage (TWIN-SAL), Economiquity 2 
(Nov. 1999) (the newsletter of the Indian organization CUTS Centre for International Trade, Economics and 




                                                                                                                                                              
and often northern leaders and the northern media, call for WTO authorization of unilaterally 
determined trade restrictions without any significant complementary financial assistance. Well 
before the Seattle concatenations, reams of U.S. law review articles addressed how WTO rules 
should be modified or interpreted to accommodate trade restrictions imposed on environmental 
grounds. In response to the Seattle mayhem, the U.S. media supported some of the protesters= 
demands. The New York Times= lead editorial concluded that WTO dispute settlement panels 
Ashould bend over backward to side with the environmental advocates when the cause is just and 
not a disguised form of protectionism,@9 ignoring developing country claims that the cause is not 
just if no financial assistance is provided to them, and that self-interested producers are always in 
league with well-meaning environmental activists when it comes to bans on the importation of 
developing countries= competitive products. 
National representatives before the WTO may adopt trade liberal or social policy rhetoric 
when advancing arguments in WTO negotiations. This does not mean that they are trade liberals 
or social activists. Rather, as shown by this author=s detailed study on state positions within the 
WTO on trade-environment matters, state representatives primarily react to domestic constituent 
pressures.10 Although developing country nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may be harsh 
critics of their governments at home, they have largely supported them internationally in opposing 
developed country NGO demands for WTO accommodation of U.S. trade restrictions.11  
 
opposition to Linkage of Labour and Environmental Standards to WTO and to trade treaties. We also wish to 
disabuse the media and the governments in the developed countries of the notion that those who oppose Linkage are 
corporate interests and malign governments.@ They propose that environmental issues be handled in environmental 
agencies, such as the United Nations Environmental Programme); Joint NGO Statement on Issues and Proposals for 
the WTO Ministerial Conference, 8-11, available at <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/issue-cn.htm> (last visited 
May 10, 2001) (signed by 34 NGOs from developing countries, including Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, 
Uruguay, and Zimbabwe; stating AThe environment should not be made use of as an issue for protectionism by the 
powerful for that would unfairly shift the adjustment cost to the weaker countries and people . . . . There should be 
no recourse to unilateral trade actions for any purpose.@). 
9 Messages for the W.T.O., <BI>N.Y. Times<D>, Dec. 2, 1999, at A30. 
10 Shaffer, WTO Under Challenge, supra note 1, at 68-74, 81-83. 
11 Id.  For example, in respect of the shrimp-turtle dispute between India and the United States, the Center 
for Science and Environment (CSE), an Indian environmental NGO, criticized the Indian government for not 
insisting Athat all trawlers catching shrimp must use a turtle excluder device.@ The CSE maintains, Atrust the 
government of India and its arms like the ministry of environment and forests to sit idle while the turtle massacre 




                                                                                                                                                              
Even though the primary aim of the WTO is to facilitate the negotiation of liberalized 
trade policies, state representatives typically take mercantilist positions within it. As mercantilists, 
they strive to expand national exports, limit foreign imports, and in this way, satisfy both their 
exporting and non-exporting producer interests.12 Given mercantilist intergovernmental 
bargaining in the WTO, developing countries are concerned that, in practice, the United States 
and EU would impose trade restrictions on environmental grounds to satisfy domestic producer 
interests. In both the controversial tuna-dolphin and shrimp-turtle cases, although 
environmentalists may have had idealist ends, domestic producer interests used environmental 
concerns to mask self-serving motives. Indeed, in the shrimp-turtle case, it was conservative Gulf 
Coast representatives in the U.S. Congress who were the sole sponsors of the relevant legislation. 
They sponsored it only after the state of Louisiana and its shrimping industry failed to block 
application of a similar domestic regulation before U.S. federal courts. U.S. environmental groups 
then allied with the Gulf Coast shrimping industry to sue the U.S. government before U.S. courts 
to enjoin it to implement the import ban on South and Southeast Asian shrimp. 13 
Developing country representatives may rhetorically employ a trade liberal rationale for 
not adopting a WTO social clause. Yet their primary concern is how such clause would operate in 
practice. They fear that it would be constructed and used by developed countries to restrict 
developing country imports, and not vice versa, thereby worsening existing biases against them.14 
 
publication, the CSE confirmed that it Ahas consistently opposed the use of trade sanctions to conserve the global 
environment because of the simple reason that only economically powerful nations can impose effective trade 
sanctions against less economically powerful nations.@ Anil Agarwal, Turtles Shrimp and a Ban, Down to Earth, 
June 15, 1998, at 4. See also, Trade Control is Not a Fair Instrument, Down to Earth, Aug. 15, 1992, at 4 (referring 
to how Atrade and human rights are being used today as sticks to beat the South@); and BS Chimni, AWTO and 
Environment: Legitimisation of Unilateral Trade Sanctions,@ Economic and Political Weekly, at 133, 137-8, Jan. 12, 
2002 (writing in response to the WTO shrimp-turtle case, Ait brings about a situation whereby the powerful north can 
use unilateral trade measures to coerce the poor south to accept bilateral or multilateral environmental arrangements, 
but not accept constraints on itself when it does not suit its interests@); and B.S. Chimni, AWTO and Environment: 
Shrimp-Turtle and EC-Hormone Cases,@ 35 Economic and Political Weekly, 1752 (May 13, 2000). 
12 Shaffer, WTO Under Challenge, supra note 1, at 30-35, 52. 
13 See Shaffer, Power, Governance and the WTO, supra note 1; and Gregory Shaffer, Trade and 
Environment: Options for Resolving the WTO Shrimp-Turtle Case, 15 Int=l Trade Rep. (BNA) 294, 295 (Feb. 18, 
1998). 
14 See, e.g., Bhagwati, Stream of Windows, at 262-263 (noting that, in light of the power politics of 
international trade negotiations, the social clause would likely be constructed so that there would not be challenges 




                                                                                                                                                              
They fear that the integration of environmental mandates into the WTO could be used 
predominantly by the big powers to appease domestic constituencies by blocking developing 
country imports, without any compensation to developing countries. Developing country NGOs 
often have very different priorities than their developed country counterparts. Yet even where 
developing country NGOs have identical ideals, they have experienced in a more direct manner 
how power politics in international economic relations affects their application. While it is 
appropriate for developing countries to enact social standards, it is not apparent to them why this 
should be imposed and enforced by an international trade regime or through unilateral action by 
the United States. Many of them assert that such measures are coercive and undemocratic because 
they interfere with developing country policymaking choices to advance developing country-
determined priorities.15  It is the law-in-action of international economic relations that they 
distrust. 
 
Domestic Politics in the United States Over the Trade-Environment Nexus 
Anti-WTO protests to the contrary, the WTO can do little about the underlying trade-
environment nexus until there is a change in domestic politics within the world=s great economic 
powers. If the United States wishes to seriously address critical international environmental 
problems such as global warming, the United States needs to do much more than impose trade 
restrictions. It can implement policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and spur the 
development and use of new technologies at home that can be exported abroad. If the United 
States is serious about environmental problems in developing countries, it can provide financial 
and technical assistance to assess and implement appropriate sustainable development policies, 
 
Rather, the clause would likely cover child labor, which is a problem only in developing countries on account of 
their level of development.). 
15 See, e.g., comments of Vandana Shiva, Director of the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and 
Natural Resource Policy, India, in Policing the Global Economy: Why, How and for Whom? 105, 194 (Sadruddin 
Aga Khan ed., 1998) (Athe principle that was the basis of the negotiation of the Rio treaty . . . was a principle of 
human rights, democracy, sovereignty and development. It was the right to development, which also implies the full 
realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, which in turn includes the exercise of their inalienable rights 
to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources. That right to development, to me, is the key test in 




                                                
including through market-based mechanisms.16 In each case, however, the United States does 
little because of U.S. domestic politics. Yet U.S. protestors target their disdain on the WTO and 
not so much on their own home government. 
Environmental problems require positive policy responses, but the trade-environment 
debate in the United States has almost solely revolved around the WTO legality of negative trade 
restrictions against those least well off. Were the United States serious about assisting with 
environmental protection efforts abroad, it would not simply ban foreign imports, but would help 
fund assessments of problems and implementation of improvements. There are international 
institutions mandated to do this, and in particular the United Nations Development Programme, 
the United Nations Environmental Programme, and the Global Environment Facility. Working 
with and through these institutions is a more coherent way of addressing foreign environmental 
issues than bringing them to an international trade organization in which countries truck and 
barter their trading interests. Yet the United States, which is by far the wealthiest country in the 
world, gives only about 0.016% of its gross domestic product in foreign aid, most of it targeted to 
Israel and Egypt for political and security reasons.17 During the 1990s, the amount of U.S. foreign 
aid declined an average of 8% per year, although it has increased slightly under the Bush 
administration.18 
The massive protests of U.S. activists have tended to respond to foreign challenges of U.S. 
trade banns rather than U.S. environmental policies generally. The Seattle protestors, for example, 
 
16 See, e.g., discussion of market-based mechanisms, in Jonathon Wiener, Global Environmental 
Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 Yale L.J. 677 (1999). 
17 In 2004, the United States’ foreign aid commitment was only 0.16% of its gross national product, which 
is one of the lowest percentages among developed nations, per http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/34700392.pdf. 
In 2003, the United States’ foreign aid commitment was only 0.15% of its gross national product, per 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/9/1893143.xls, with Israel receiving the greatest amount of US foreign aid, per 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/30/1860571.gif. See also Tim Weiner, House Votes to Cut $2 Billion From 
Clinton Foreign Aid Plan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1999, at A3 (noting that the U.S. House of Representatives passed a 
$12.6 billion foreign aid bill for 2000 with $4.88 billion earmarked for Israel and Egypt); and THE STATESMAN=S 
YEARBOOK: THE POLITICS, CULTURE AND ECONOMIES OF THE WORLD 2001 (Barry Turner ed.) 1687 (2001) (AIn 
terms of a percentage of GDP, the USA was the least generous major industrialized country@ in granting 
international aid).  
18 Since 2001, the official development aid amount disbursed by the United States as a percentage of its 
gross national product has increased from 0.11% in 2001 to 0.16% in 2004, per 
http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/USAid.asp. Cf. Joseph Kahn, The World=s Bankers Try Giving 




                                                
lambasted the WTO for failing to support the United States= ban on imports of South and 
Southeast Asian shrimp because of these countries= failure to require their shrimp trawlers to use 
sea turtle protection devices required in U.S. domestic regulation. However, there have been no 
mass protests against the United States= refusal to take domestic measures to reduce its 
contribution to global warming, even though the United States is responsible for over one third of 
all greenhouse gas emissions. Nor have there been mass protests against the United States= failure 
to provide financial assistance for environmental improvements in developing countries, a need 
documented in Agenda 21 signed at the 1992 AEarth Summit@ in Rio de Janeiro. Under pressure 
from oil-producing interests, the U.S. Congress has refused to enact a tax on carbon emissions 
that would create incentives to reduce them. In response to lobbying from U.S. automobile 
manufacturers, Congress has relaxed fuel efficiency requirements for mini-vans and sports utility 
vehicles to 20.7 miles per gallon (mpg) (as opposed to 27.5 mpg for all other automobiles).19 
Under pressure from U.S. corporate interests, the United States has refused to ratify the United 
Nations Convention on Bio-diversity or the Kyoto Protocol on climate change.20 Yet there have 
been no significant protests in the United States against these policy decisions supported by U.S. 
multinational corporate interests, certainly nothing comparable to the scale in Seattle. Similarly, 
as Bhagwati pointed out regarding the EC meat hormones case, AThe uproar that followed in 
Europe over the ruling by the WTO=s Dispute Settlement Mechanism... led to little sympathetic 
protest by the otherwise articulate U.S.-based NGOs.... It is hard to believe that the U.S.-based 
anti-WTO NGOs were not mindful of the fact that it was an issue that affected the U.S. economy; 
rather, it seems plausible that they had decided, perhaps unconsciously, to avoid getting into a 
 
19 Keith Bradsher, With Sport Utility Vehicles More Popular, Overall Automobile Fuel Economy Continues 
to Fall, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1999, at A22 (noting that average fuel economy has been falling ever since the 1987 and 
1988 model years, with the decline having Aaccelerated@).; and Senate Votes for Increasing Fuel Economy 
Requirements (CAFÉ), Green Car Congress, available at 
http://www.greencarcongress.com/2005/06/senate_votes_fo_1.html (noting that the Senate recently passed an 
energy bill that increases fuel economy for passenger vehicles, but rejected the Durbin Amendment, which proposed 
to apply the fuel economy increases to SUVs and trucks).  
20 See e.g., Revkin, Cutting Greenhouse Gas, supra note ...; and James Brooke, U.S. Has a Starring Role at 
Rio Summit as Villain, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1992, at A10;  Barbara Crossette, Tying Down Gulliver with those Pesky 
Treaties, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1999, at 4:3 (noting that the United States has also  refused to ratify treaties 
prohibiting the use of child soldiers, banning land mines, creating a permanent international criminal court, and 




                                                
bruising campaign that would cost them some goodwill within the United States, where thy are 
based.@21 
The primary explanation for the U.S. political preference for trade bans is that it is much 
easier to complain about foreigners and use economic power to impose costs on foreigners, than 
to look critically at what one does at home. It is much easier to close markets to foreignersCand 
poor ones at thatCthan to protest against U.S. middle class preferences for cheap oil and treasured 
gas guzzling minivans and sports utility vehicles. If U.S. environmental NGOs wish to receive 
large contributions from the U.S. public, it is easier for them to challenge poor countries= 
production processes than central aspects of American consumer culture with its negative 
environmental impacts. To be fair, many U.S. environmental groups have been on the forefront of 
demanding greater U.S. contributions toward sustainable development projects and a more 
aggressive domestic approach to confront global warming. However, they are less successful on 
these fronts because of U.S. political constraints.  Although U.S. environmental NGOs may 
pursue altruistic environmental goals, as any political actor, they are self-interested in their own 
continuity and political relevance. They do what they can within a given political context to 
attempt to protect the oceans, the atmosphere, endangered species and their habitat. Even if 
northern NGOs were to take a more aggressive approach, it is unlikely they could whip up the 
sort of passions seen in the streets of Seattle. 
The WTO shrimp-turtle case provides a prime example of the domestic political context 
behind U.S. trade-environment policy choices. The U.S. legislation was easy to pass because it 
appeased the U.S. shrimping industry by forcing developing country shrimp trawlers to either use 
the same standards required in the United States or face an import ban. Legislation of this sort is 
more easily passed than financing serious environmental studies of the local sea turtle problems in 
developing countries and the most effective ways to address them. Through conditioning access 
to the U.S. market on the requirement of a developing country=s adoption of a U.S. regulatory 
framework, the United States was attempting to force developing countries to assume the costs of 
these U.S. Congressional priorities. While it is true that some of these costs could be passed onto 
U.S. consumers in the form of higher prices, developing country shrimpers would have to fund 
 




                                                
the costs of meeting U.S. requirements, and developing country governments would have to fund 
public awareness campaigns, the, monitoring of compliance, and enforcement were the programs 
to be effective. Moreover, although it may be important for developing countries to require the 
use of turtle excluder devices by shrimp trawlers, no one in the U.S. Congress ever asked whether 
it was the most appropriate or effective way to proceed in a developing country context. No one 
in the U.S. Congress looked at a study of local Asian conditions or heard any testimony as to what 
was the nature of the Asian sea turtle problem. No one assessed whether there might be other first 
order problems, such as the stealing and sale of sea turtle eggs, such that the U.S. legislation 
might be mis-targeted. Developing country parliaments and constituents were never consulted to 
see if this was in fact their social priority.22 Yet it is they who have to expend resources on this 
U.S.-determined social priority, with less funds available for competing social programs. In the 
end, neither the United States, nor U.S. non-governmental organizations, have offered any serious 
financial assistance to allay these costs.23 Although the United States and U.S. non-governmental 
groups claim that the costs are minimal, they ignore that local regulatory enforcement costs are 
significant. Without local enforcement, the regulations become merely symbolic.  For example, to 
avoid U.S. trade restrictions on shrimp imports, the foreign country must enact the shrimping 
regulations desired by the United States. When the United States sends an observer about one 
week per year, who is accompanied by a foreign fisheries official as translator, it is relatively easy 
for shrimp trawlers to use TEDs that week so as to demonstrate compliance with the U.S. 
program. The program can become a charade. Yet it is the symbolism of trade restrictions that 
assumes more importance than real financial outlays and tax incentives targeted toward 
environmental protection. 
The United States chooses trade restrictions over financial outlays even though they 
impose costs on U.S. residents and are not necessarily cheaper for the United States in aggregate. 
A ban on Asian shrimp imports results in higher priced shrimp in the U.S. market and less 
consumer pocket money for other goods. Although the costs are marginal per American 
 
22I traveled to the sea turtle nesting beaches in Thailand and the main fishing harbors and not surprisingly 
found the issues much more complex than contemplated by the U.S. legislation. 
23 The World Wildlife Fund does, however, support some local NGO efforts to protect sea turtle nesting 




consumer, they add up. This de facto shrimp tax, however, is far easier to pass because it is more 
beneficial to the U.S. shrimp industry, on the one hand, and less transparent to the U.S. general 
public, on the other.  
A de facto shrimp tax is less transparent in two important ways than funding for 
environmental protection. First, the de facto shrimp tax does not appear on receipts when U.S. 
consumers buy shrimp, so they remain unaware of the tax=s existence. Second, it is easier to track 
how targeted funds for a conservation program are being used and whether the program is cost-
effective. Whereas the de facto shrimp tax=s aggregate amount is impossible to calculate, a line 
item budget allocation for Asian sea turtle conservation is easily reported in the media. Although 
an import ban and subsidization of environmental improvement projects may have similar aims, 
and although both impose costs on U.S. consumers, the ban is typically chosen instead of positive 
financial assistance on account of the lack of transparency of its costs to the U.S. public.  
In addition, and probably most importantly, import bans directly benefit U.S. producers, 
unlike financial assistance to fund environmental protection efforts abroad. U.S. producers have 
high per capita stakes in the outcome of Congressional policy choices. They are thus more likely 
than other U.S. constituents to lobby Congress and to present it with informed views on 
alternative policy options. The result is U.S. trade restrictions that trigger controversial disputes 
brought before the WTO, ensuing challenges to WTO legitimacy, and largely ineffective 
environmental protection because developing country governments and their constituencies are 
treated primarily as antagonists. 
It is this linkage between domestic politics and international trade and environment policies 
that is a fundamental challenge to the WTO and other international institutions. The United States 
does not provide significant financial support to international environmental institutions to 
promote positive sustainable development measures. The United States does not take measures to 
reduce its own emissions which lead to a much graver environmental challengeCglobal warming. 
For domestic political reasons, U.S. activists are most successful in garnering support when they 
focus on trade restrictions to compel change in developing country regulatory policies as opposed 
to the need for greater financial assistance which more transparently taps the pocketbooks of U.S. 
taxpayers. It is this fundamental disconnection between international and foreign environmental 




the world with its severest environmental problems and the WTO with controversies that it is ill-
equipped to address. Developing countries recognize American hypocrisy. But it looms low in 
legal analysis of the international Atrade-environment linkage.@ 
 
Conclusion: U.S. Domestic Politics and the WTO 
This essay has taken a separate track from that of most northern commentators on trade-
social policy linkages by assessing a second linkageCthe domestic-international one. Simply 
stated, trade restrictions alone will not achieve most of the goals of anti-WTO protestors. To be 
effective, an international campaign to protect the environment requires positive programs by 
national governments and international agencies, whether or not these are implemented 
independently or as a complement to trade restrictions. Required initiatives include multilateral 
efforts to address global issues, such as climate change, protection of the ozone, and assistance to 
developing countries in devising effective environmental policies at the national level.  
This essay shows why it is unlikely that the debate over trade sanctions in support of 
environmental goals will advance until there is greater evidence of political will within developed 
countries, and particularly within the United States, to address their own internal environmental 
problems and to expand their foreign economic assistance on environmental matters. Activists 
from northern states will not be successful in having developing countries agree to a modification 
(or interpretation) of WTO rules that would facilitate the imposition of trade restrictions on agreed 
environmental grounds unless the United States, Europe and other developed countries also agree 
to provide significant financial assistance to developing countries for implementing appropriate 
environmental policies. Moreover, from both equity and efficiency perspectives, developing 
countries and developing country constituencies should retain a significant role in shaping and 
adapting these policies to their local conditions so that developing country constituencies have a 
stake in them and the policies are appropriate for the local situation. Only then will these policies 
be effective. 
It is unfortunate that so much of the trade-environment, trade-labor debate in the United 
States focuses on trade restrictions. The central explanation appears to be domestic politics within 
powerful states. It is simply easier to lambast the WTO than to get Congress= attention to pass 




tax and funding for sustainable development projects abroad impose direct costs on domestic 
constituents in the form of taxes. When these initiatives are thwarted in the United States, it is 
more difficult to garner public sympathy through dramatic protests. Yet livelihoods and 
environmental welfare remain at risk. Activists more easily rally masses by proclaiming that the 
threat=s cause lies in foreign (or Amultinational@) producers and their protector, the WTO. They 
focus their limited resources where they are most likely to succeed. Yet their demand for trade 
restrictions can become mere symbols that defuse and divert challenges away from the United 
States= own domestic policies. 
The WTO=s future development depends, in large part, not on whether it facilitates the use 
of trade restrictions, but rather on how trade liberalization policies are coordinated with the 
provision of environmental protection, domestically and internationally. Trade negotiations at the 
international level traditionally involve package deals based on reciprocal trade concessions. In 
order to sustain the welfare-enhancing, non-discriminatory goals of liberalized trade, we need to 
direct more attention to packages that include the advancement of environmental and social 
policies domestically and internationally. The question becomes: in return for further trade 
liberalization, what domestic, foreign and international environmental and social programs will 
trade liberals endorse, and how energetically will they do so? Resolution of the WTO=s trade-
environment blues will require collaborative initiatives of trade liberal policy networks, export-
oriented commercial interests, and labor and environmental constituencies. Only then will we 
attain the broad-based benefits that liberalized trade makes possible, and with them, a more 
positive future for the WTO. 
Yet whatever one=s position on these environmental policy questions, there is not much that 
the WTO alone can do about them. While the management of green trade issues has become a 
great challenge for the WTO, it is a challenge that the WTO is ill-equipped to handle because of 
this second linkage to domestic politics in powerful states. This second under-analyzed, underlying 
linkage of domestic politics and international negotiating positions is a critical part of the 
explanation of the WTO=s current dilemma. 
 
 
